

"Habeas Corpus for Nonhuman Animals"

Kevin R. Schneider, Esq.
Executive Director
The Nonhuman Rights Project


Idaho State Bar, CLE Presentation April 9, 2019



NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT

Founded in 1996 by attorney Steven M. Wise, the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) works to secure legally recognized fundamental rights for nonhuman animals through litigation, advocacy, and education. Our mission is to change the legal status of at least some nonhuman animals from mere "things," which lack the capacity to possess any legal right, to "persons," who possess such fundamental rights as bodily integrity and bodily liberty and those other legal rights to which evolving standards of morality, scientific discovery, and human experience entitle them. Our current plaintiffs are members of species who have been scientifically proven to be autonomous: currently, great apes, elephants, dolphins, and whales.

Our Approach





Welfare vs. Rights



Still prioritizes the interests of humans.



Prioritizes animals' own interests.





In December, 2013, the NhRP filed the world's first <u>common law habeas corpus petition</u> on behalf of a nonhuman animal when we filed on behalf of Tommy, a chimpanzee we found alone in a cage in a shed on a trailer lot in upstate New York.





What is "common law habeas corpus"?

The "common law" is the law that judges make, as opposed to acts of legislatures, parliaments, or the executive.

At one time, the common law was the primary source of law that judges used in deciding cases, and it still plays an important role in parts of the law.



Habeas corpus is one of the oldest "tools" in the common law.

Habeas corpus was created to protect the <u>autonomy</u> of "persons" and historically was used to contest private and unlawful detention (i.e., it could be invoked to get the state involved in setting an innocent "person" free, including by force if necessary).



The key word is "person": Who counts as one?

Why does it matter?



The law generally categorizes the world crudely into "things" or "persons." We can also understand this distinction as "objects" and "subjects."

In the eyes of the law, all that "person" means is the capacity for legal rights.



Habeas corpus has a rich and unique history of being used to force the legal system to accept the personhood and fundamental rights of what were then "legal things" including slaves, Native Americans, and women, and set them free from their abusive "owners" or "masters."



In the eyes of the law, "person" has never been and still is not a matter of biology; rather it's a matter of public policy.

After hundreds of years of struggle, it is now the birthright of every human being to be a person.

For hundreds of years before that, corporations and ships, among other nonhuman entities, were already being treated as "persons."



A "person" can have a theoretically infinite number of rights, while a "thing" is incapable of having any rights, even those which protect her most fundamental interests.

Currently, virtually every nonhuman animal in the world is a legal thing.



We build our cases around those principles that judges claim to believe in, including liberty, equality, and **autonomy.**

Autonomy is one of the most important principles in our court cases, and drives much of the scientific evidence we submit, including scientific affidavits from some of the world's leading experts in nonhuman animal cognition.



Science shows beyond doubt that we are not the only species who have and value our autonomy.

A primary stated purpose of the law is to protect autonomy.

We argue autonony is a *sufficient but not necessary* basis for personhood and rights.

Elephant Experts:

- Lucy Bates
- Richard Byrne
- Karen McComb
- Cynthia Moss
- Joyce Poole

Chimpanzee Experts:

- James Anderson
- Christophe Boesch
- Mary Lee Jensvold
- William McGrew
- Sue Savage-Rumbaugh
- Jane Goodall
- Jennifer Fugate
- James King
- Tetsuro Matsuzawa
- Mathias Osvath

- 33. Further related to empathy, coalitions and cooperation have been documented in wild African elephants, particularly to defend family members or close allies from (potential) attacks by outsiders, such as when a family group tries to 'kidnap' a calf from an unrelated family (Lee 1987, Moss and Poole 1983). These behaviours are based on one elephant understanding the emotions and goals of the coalition partner (Bates et al 2008).
- 34. Cooperation is also evident in experimental tests with captive Asian elephants, whereby elephants demonstrated they can work together in pairs to obtain a reward, and understood that it was pointless to attempt the task if their partner was not present or could not access the equipment (Plotnik et al 2011). Problem-solving and working together to achieve a collectively desired outcome involve mentally representing both a goal and the sequence of behaviours that is required to achieve that goal; it is based on (at the very least) short-term action planning.
 - 48. Both African and Asian elephants evidently share many key traits of autonomy with humans, and so parsimoniously it must be concluded that elephants are also autonomous beings.
 - 49. Scientific knowledge about elephant intelligence has been increasing rapidly in the past decade: what we currently know is only a tiny fraction of what elephant brains are likely capable of, and yet more amazing abilities are still likely to be discovered.

Cynthia J. Moss

- 24. None of the many field staff, students and other researchers who have worked among the Gombe chimps for 55 years have ever been really harmed. We have been hit, stamped on and dragged during displays, but never received bite wounds. One male in particular, Frodo, was continually charging people and hitting them, and he sometimes pushed me over. It is clear, however, that the chimpanzees only intend to impress, to emphasize their superiority. They could so easily harm us badly, even kill us. On three separate occasions, when I was above a very steep drop, Frodo charged up but did not make contact. Our videographer, Bill Wallauer, reported four such occasions. It was very clear to us that Frodo understood what would have happened on those seven occasions. The same thing happened to me once with a different alpha male. They are clear examples of intention *not* to harm.
- 25. I have written about a male chimpanzee in captivity who rescued his human caretaker, Mark Cusano, with whom he had a close relationship, from a very bad attack from three adult females. Mark told me that the chimp had saved his life.
- 26. Based upon my research and expertise in this field, I support the NhRP's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Tommy and the application of common law personhood to chimpanzees.

Jane Goodali, Ph.D, DBE

Our Clients



Hercules and Leo

Two former research subjects and the first nonhuman animals to have a habeas corpus hearing.

Beulah, Karen, and Minnie

Torn from their families and forced to perform for humans for decades.





Hercules and Leo

Two former research subjects and the first nonhuman animals to have a habeas corpus hearing.



FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/20/2015 12:50 PM

INDEX NO. 152736/2015

INGGED DOG NO 34

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/20/2015

At I.A.S Part 12 of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, held in and for the County of New York, at the Courthouse thereof, 80 Centre Street, New York, NY, on the 20 day of 1971, 2015

BARBARA JAFF

ESENT: HON.

Justice of the Supreme Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

RECEIVED

APR 17 2015

In the Matter of a Proceeding under Article 70 of the CPLR for a Writ of Habeas Corpus,

PART 12

THE NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, INC., on behalf of HERCULES and LEO,

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE & WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner,

-against-

Index No.: 152 736/15

SAMUEL L. STANLEY JR., M.D., as President of State University of New York at Stony Brook a/k/a Stony Brook University and STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT STONY BROOK a/k/a STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY,

Respondents.

TO THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS:

1












Isn't it incumbent on the judiciary to at least consider whether a class of beings might be granted a right or something short of the right under the habeas corpus law?

"





Tommy & Kiko
The Nonhuman Rights A former animal "actor,"
Project's first client. partially deaf from past
physical abuse.

Tommy's first case began in December 2013 and ended in an appeal decision in 2014 stating that rights require a correlative ability to bear "social duties and responsibilities," and that chimpanzees lack it.

Kiko's first case began in December 2013 and ended in an appeal decision in 2015 staing that seeking transfer to sanctuary was not an appropriate use of habeas corpus since we were not seeking "immediate release."



On May 8, 2018, Judge Eugene Fahey of the New York Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Nonhuman Rights Project v. Lavery, which begins:

"The inadequacy of the law as a vehicle to address some of the most difficult ethical dilemmas is on display in this matter."

State of New York Court of Appeals

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the New York Reports.

Motion No. 2018-268 In the Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., on Behalf of Tommy,

Appellant,

Patrick C. Lavery, &c., et al.,

Respondents

In the Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., on Behalf of Kiko,

Appellant,

Carmen Presti et al.,

Respondents

Decided May 8, 2018:

Motion for leave to appeal denied. Chief Judge DiFiore and Judges Rivera, Fahey, Garcia and Wilson concur, Judge Fahey in an opinion. Judges Stein and Feinman took no part.

FAHEY, J. (concurring):

The inadequacy of the law as a vehicle to address some of our most difficult ethical

dilemmas is on display in this matter.

- 2

In these habeas corpus proceedings brought by opon behalf of Tomay and Kito, two captive chimpanzoe from an order of the Appellate Division, First Deput Supreme Court declining to sign orders to show cause relief. The adult chimpanzees, according to the habean relief owners to small cages in a wavehouse and a centest area, respectively.

If this Court were to grant petitioner leave to app to affirm parsuant to CPLR 7003 (b) (Successive petition in the Court's decision to desty leave.

However, I write to underscore that denial of lost merits of petitioner's claims. The question will have to non-human animal be entitled to release from confincorpus? Should such a being be treated as a person or a

"A person illegally imprisoned or otherwise rest or one acting on his for her pledulf ... may position corpus to inquire into the cause of such detention and I The lower courts in this appeal and related cause, manufable to challenge the legality of the chiespana instance on discincary definitions. The habeas corpus as decinoaries instruct us that the meaning of the world

- 2 -

However, I write to underscore that denial of leave to appeal is not a decision on the merits of petitioner's claims. The question will have to be addressed eventually. Can a non-human animal be entitled to release from confinement through the writ of habeas corpus? Should such a being be treated as a person or as property, in essence a thing?

+ 3

recognized by law as having most of the rights and dati Dictionary [10th ed 2014], person [3], see also, http://www.oed.com [last secessed May 4, 2018], p corporate body... recognized by the law as having or

The Appellus Division then reasoned that climing lank "the capacity or shifty... to bear legal duties, they lank "the capacity or shifty... to bear legal duties, for their sections" Oldsteet of Northean Bights Division.

[1st Dept 2017]: need no Depele ext. Menhaman Bights

1st. 152 [All Dept 2014]. Indexind 20 NYM 902 [2013] bear any legal duties, submit to societal responsibilities with their sections"]. Peritioners and moist law professors: La and Samurd Wiseman question this assumption. Eve nonhuman minusts cannot bear duties, the same is tre-human adults, yet no one would suppose that it is improve behalf of one's infinite child (see People ext. Mythex. or a parent suffering from dementing cape. and mitted.

227 AD2d 969 [4th Dept 1996]. In short, being a "more act as mentally requires is not a necessary condition of be wronged and may have the right to reduces wrongs (see for Animal Rights 151-156 [2d ed 2004]).

227 AD2d 969 [4th Dept 1996]). In short, being a "moral agent" who can freely choose to act as morality requires is not a necessary condition of being a "moral patient" who can be wronged and may have the right to redress wrongs (see generally Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights 151-156 [2d ed 2004]).

Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., on Behalf of Tommy v. Lavery, 31 N.Y.3d 1054 (May 8, 2018) ("Tommy") (Eugene Fahey, J., concurring)

The Appellate Division's conclusion that a chimp "person" and is not entitled to habeas relief is in fact bu premise that a chimpunzee is not a member of the human "Project, Inc., 152 AD3d at 78 [stating that petitioner's acknowledge a legal duty or legal responsibility should not to habeas relief, since, for example, infants cannot compresponsibilities and a contatose person lacks sentience, yo ignores the fact that these are still human beings members agree with the principle that all human beings gossess intrin in the United States (and territory completely centrolle privilege of habeas corpus, regardless of whether they a <u>Doumodinery Publs</u>, 553 US 723 [2008]), but, in elevant lower the status of other histly intelligent species.

of a person or whether a chimpanzee has the same rights and duties as a human bein

instead whether he or she has the right to liberty protected by habeas corpus. That question, $% \left(\frac{1}{2}\right) =\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{1}{2}\right) =\frac{$

one of precise moral and legal status, is the one that mail to that question will depend on our assessment of the intr species. The record before us in the motion for leave evidence, in the form of affidavits from eminent primat advanced cognitive abilities, including being able to rem

The better approach in my view is to ask not wheth

The Appellate Division's conclusion that a chimpanzee cannot be considered a "person" and is not entitled to habeas relief is in fact based on nothing more than the premise that a chimpanzee is not a member of the human species (see Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., 152 AD3d at 78 [stating that petitioner's argument "that the ability to

Boumediene v Bush, 553 US 723 [2008]), but, in elevating our species, we should not

lower the status of other highly intelligent species.


Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., on Behalf of Tommy v. Lavery, 31 N.Y.3d 1054 (May 8, 2018) ("Tommy") (Eugene Fahey, J., concurring)

future, the capacities of self-awareness a through sign language. Chimpunzees themselves in mirrors, photographs, and to compassion and depression when a comlumor. Moreover, the amici philosophers draw our attention to recent evidence th initiating intentional, adequately informed L. Beauchamp, Victoria Wobber. <u>Autono</u> Bioethics 117 [2014]: <u>sex generally</u>. June of Behavior 15-42 [1986]).

Does an intelligent nonhuman anin human beings do have the right to the pro enforced detentions visited on him or her a deep dilemma of ethics and policy that if he or she had no right to liberty protect as entirely lacking independent worth, as of which consists exclusively in its used whether a chimpuraree is an individual wi with respect (see generally Regam, The Cr.

The Appellate Division's appn respect. Petitioner seeks the transfers through sign language. Chimpanzees make tools to catch insects; they recognize themselves in mirrors, photographs, and television images; they imitate others; they exhibit compassion and depression when a community member dies; they even display a sense of humor. Moreover, the amici philosophers with expertise in animal ethics and related areas draw our attention to recent evidence that chimpanzees demonstrate autonomy by selfinitiating intentional, adequately informed actions, free of controlling influences (see Tom L. Beauchamp, Victoria Wobber, Autonomy in chimpanzees, 35 Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 117 [2014]; see generally Jane Goodall, The Chimpanzees of Gombe: Patterns of Behavior 15-42 [1986]).

Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., on Behalf of Tommy v. Lavery, 31 N.Y.3d 1054 (May 8, 2018) ("Tommy") (Eugene Fahey, J., concurring)



"We write as a diverse group of philosophers who share the conviction that if the concept of 'personhood' is being employed by the courts to determine whether to extend or deny the writs of habeas corpus, they should employ a consistent and reasonable definition of 'personhood' and 'persons.' We believe that the previous judgements offered by the Third, Fourth, and First Departments of the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court applied inconsistent definitions of 'personhood."

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The Appellate Division's approx respect. Petitioner seeks the transfers of


Does an intelligent nonhuman animal who thinks and plans and appreciates life as human beings do have the right to the protection of the law against arbitrary cruelties and enforced detentions visited on him or her? This is not merely a definitional question, but a deep dilemma of ethics and policy that demands our attention. To treat a chimpanzee as if he or she had no right to liberty protected by habeas corpus is to regard the chimpanzee as entirely lacking independent worth, as a mere resource for human use, a thing the value of which consists exclusively in its usefulness to others. Instead, we should consider whether a chimpanzee is an individual with inherent value who has the right to be treated with respect (see generally Regan, The Case for Animal Rights 248-250).

Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., on Behalf of Tommy v. Lavery, 31 N.Y.3d 1054 (May 8, 2018) ("Tommy") (Eugene Fahey, J., concurring)



"The issue whether a nonhuman animal has a fundamental right to liberty protected by the writ of habeas corpus is profound and far-reaching. It speaks to our relationship with all the life around us. Ultimately, we will not be able to ignore it. While it may be arguable that a chimpanzee is not a 'person,' there is no doubt that it is not merely a thing."

> - Judge Eugene M. Fahey -Associate Judge on the NY Court of Appeals





Beulah, Karen, and Minnie

Torn from their families and forced to perform for humans for decades.












JIM BREHENY DIRECTOR OF THE BRONX ZOO

"The Nonhuman Rights Project is exploiting the Bronx Zoo elephants to advance their own failing cause in the courts as they put forth ludicrous legal arguments and lies about our elephants, facilities and staff."





We will launch a campaign for the world's first nonhuman animal rights ordinance in a major US city in 2019.

It will seek rights to bodily liberty and bodily integrity for chimpanzees and elephants, much the same we are seeking through our lawsuits.

THE POWER OF MUNICIPALITIES TO ENACT LEGISLATION GRANTING LEGAL RIGHTS TO NONHUMAN ANIMALS PURSUANT TO HOME RULE

Steven M. Wise, Elizabeth Stein, Monica Miller & Sarah Stone[†]


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[†] The co-authors are staff attorneys for the Nonhuman Rights Project, the mission of which is to attain fundamental legal rights for at least some nonhuman animals through litigation and legislation and whose work is the subject of the 2016 HBO Documentary Films presentation of the Pennebaker Hegedus Films production, *Unlocking the Cage*. They would like to acknowledge the following individuals who helped bring this article to fruition over several years: Kevin Schneider, Esq., Ryan Gordon, Esq., Natalie Prosin, Esq., and Professor Jessica Rubin.



- Law review articles
- Media engagement and education (thousands of media stories of increasing nuance and sympathy)
 - · Books, graphic novels, art and design
 - Social media
 - Law school/undergraduate talks
 - Engaging judges and lawyers and educating the legal profession





Our work is the subject of the 2016 Pennebaker Hegedus/HBO documentary film Unlocking the Cage, which has been seen by millions around the world.



Education

Animals are thinking, feeling 'persons': Rights champion

Mumbai: A bookstore in south Mumbai would have resembled George Orwell's animal farm on Friday. The captive penguins of Mumbai zoo, elephants like Lakshmi that were fed vada pao, bulls harnessed for jalikattu races and cows whose tails are broken by inhuman transporters would have loved to meet this American visitor. Animal rights activist Kevin Schneider was in Mumbai on his whistlestop tour of India before heading to Kathmandu for a conference. Schneider is executive director of the US-based Nonhuman Rights Project (NHRP) which advocates "breaking the legal wall that separates ani-

recommends recognising ani-





be held captive and harnessed to serve human beings. Schneider rued how man-

kind treats animals as propermals from humans". ty and possession. "Animals are not things. It reminds me of Sibal introduced him to ani- a similar battle in the 1780s mal activists and lawyers to ad- when the move to abolish slave- ars ago. He turned vegetarian vocate his unique idea. NHRP ry began. Until then slaves were bought and sold, they were mals as thinking, feeling "per- treated as chattel. We are figh- ves in New York where it is sons" with individual rights ting a similar battle to protect rather than creatures that can animals by filing cases on their

running advocacy campaigns," he said.

NHRP, whose president is American author Steven M Wise, has defended elephants, dolphins and chimpanzees. "We are a resource, we can guide people and help develop a framework to deal with such issues in each country." Schneider said. He is aware of instances of man-animal conflict that have arisen here, like jalikattu. "We do receive pushback to say that preserving animal rights would take away some human rights. But that is an incomple-

te view. Enriching animal rights would help us protect human rights also," he said.

Kevin Schneider has a law degree from Florida State University. He was an attorney for four years, has worked with NHRP for over seven years and was appointed director two yewhile still in college and advocates "plant-based food". He li-"getting easier" to find vegetarian options.





We work with lawyers in over a dozen countries assisting them finding ways to work within their legal systems to create meaningful rights for nonhuman animals in their countries.

In Argentina in 2016, a court declared Cecilia, a chimpanzee, a "nonhuman legal person" and order her sent to a sanctuary.

In 2014, the Indian Supreme Court recognized the personhood (if not the rights) of all nonhuman animals in the country.

Around the world, rivers, national parks, and recently in Colombia the Amazon rainforest have been declared "legal persons" with rights.

"How should we relate to beings who look into mirrors and see themselves as individuals, who mourn companions and may die of grief, who have a consciousness of 'self?' Don't they deserve to be treated with the same sort of consideration we accord to other highly sensitive beings: ourselves?"

Jane Goodall



NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT



To learn more, sign up for our email newsletter, or to make a donation to support our work, please visit:

www.nonhumanrights.org

Kevin Schneider kschneider anonhumanrights.org anonhumanlawyer